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The moral reality: Zhu Xi’s virtuous ethics cat looks clean and should not be a wandering cat, but probably a way out from home
Author: Huang Yong (Teacher from the Department of Chinese Philosophy in Drumbi Hong Kong)
Source: Shanghai Confucian Academy of Sciences of Sodan University: “Modern Confucianism”, Seven Edition, Commercial Printing Library, 2021 edition
1. Introduction
In meta-ethics, especially in the issue of moral intrinsics, there is a dispute between moral intrinsics and anti-realistic intrinsics. In fact, the writer admits that (1) there are true or false moral deeds, and at most some of them are true; (2) The truth or falseness depends on the objective moral facts or moral character. In fact, all the commentators deny (2), and some deny (1), and two kinds of sentiments can be adopted for denying (1). Either the most basic denial of the existence of moral destiny, or the existence of moral destiny, but the truth is that there is any moral destiny. [1] Therefore, morality can actually be divided into three categories based on the theoretical basis. The most true non-cognitivism is to believe that our moral judgment does not have the meaning of recognition, so there is no truth or falsehood; it is not actually a moral destiny, but a sentiment of our emotions that have been deformed or may have the illusion of moral destiny. Therefore, this kind of standing is usually called emotivism or expressivism. For example, when we say that a certain action is inconsistent, we are actually just expressing the sentiment that we don’t like this action. Such expressions may be justified and no, but there is no difference between true and false. Important representatives of this theory are A.J.Ayer and Simon Blackburn. Another objection is to admit that moral judgments are intellectual and try to describe a certain object-oriented moral reality, but because such reality does not exist in the most basic sense, such moral judgments are always wrong, and there will never be any real moral judgments. The situation is similar to the historical phlogistin saying, which wants to use phlogistin to explain the phenomenon of pyritant, but since such phlogistin does not exist, it is always wrong to say that such phlogistin is not the most basic. So this theory is also called error theory, and it is importantly proposed by John Mackie and Richard Royce. The third kind of morality in the discussion believes that our moral judgments are true or false, but they do not recognize the existence of the objective morality. The authenticity of a moral judgment 号号号 is determined by the set of main view standards received by the judge. We say or a person’s actions are not similar to those of a referee who says a player’s actions. We can confirm this sanctionThe judgment is true or false, but we are based on the standard of the game rules, and the game rules are not objective, but are designed to make the game more pleasant. Therefore, in this way, the theory is also considered to be subjective or not objective. Most of the most anti-ethnics in contemporary metaphysics are actually considered in this category, and important representatives are Gilbert Harman and Christian Korsgaard. Morality actually has various emotions in discussion, but according to a simple classification, there are natural and non-natural ones. The moral reality of natural theory is considered to be a natural fact or natural quality, or rely on (supervene) natural fact or natural quality, and we can recognize morality as other natural phenomena. Representatives of this type of stand are Richard Boyd and Peter Railton. The moral reality of a non-natural theory is considered to be that moral facts and moral properties are not natural facts or natural properties, but mathematical properties such as the sum of the inner corners of the triangle is 180 degrees, or perhaps a metaphysical quality similar to the metaphysical properties of the situation discussed in Plague. This stand is represented by G.E.Moore and Russ Shafer-Landau. According to another less common but related plan, moral reality can also be divided into moral reality discussions that focus on moral actions and moral reality discussions that focus on moral behavior. The moral facts and moral character mentioned by the former are all facts or characteristics that are in contact with moral behavior, while the moral facts or characteristics that are in contact with the subject of moral behavior. In this meaning, the meta-ethics stances of these two morals in theory are different from several standard ethics stances that masters are familiar with: the former is related to the consequences and morals of the action, while the latter is related to the virtues of the action. The reason I say that this kind of planning is infrequently (in fact, maybe it was the first time I made this distinction here that I clearly and interestedly) is because the moral reality in contemporary moral philosophy is almost in the middle of action. The reason I say that this plan is very important to discuss this chapter is that Zhu Xi’s moral intrinsic discussion, which will focus on this chapter, not only holds the position of discussion in the actual and anti-realistic discussion, the position of natural and anti-naturalism, and also holds the position of virtue in the dispute between moral and moral discussion/consequence discussion and virtue discussion. In my opinion, moral reality must be positively opposed to some serious difficulties that debaters believe in morality must face (Secondary 2), but the moral reality in the middle cannot be fought against (Secondary 3). Only when the moral reality that takes virtue ethics as the way forward is considered, that is, the moral reality that focuses on the behavior rather than on the action is considered to be the qualityMorality is to offer a real future. In this regard, Horst, representing the most important Neo-Aristotleianism in the contemporary Oriental Virtue Ethics Rejuvenation Movement <a Although Rosalind Hurshouse did not interested in proposing a moral argument, her detailed statement of the objectivity of virtue expresses the ability of moral arguments to approach virtue ethics, but due to the inherent wise and wise tendencies of the Aristotle theory, such moral arguments cannot truly explain why a person must have virtue as a person (Section 4). The focus of this chapter is to clarify that Zhu Xi's moral reality, which takes Confucian virtue ethics as the way forward, can not only fight against the problem of the New Asianism (Chapter 5), but also can also prevent the difficulties of morality in the discussion of morality in the discussion (Chapter 6). Finally, I made a small chapter for the whole chapter.
2. Four difficulties in moral reality.
If we hold a position of anti-realism in morality, then all our moral initiatives lack objectivity. If our moral initiative lacks objectivity, we will begin to question why we should do the work that this moral initiative believes should be done. In this regard, moral reality has its unique appeal because it believes that morality is objective, that is, based on the objective morality or moral character, so we are more likely to abide by such moral requests. However, in the view of the debate on morality, there are some serious difficulties in morality.
First of all, we cannot publish it in reality. To maintain a moral reality, it means that the standardized moral initiative is based on the factual foundation. That is to say, the standardized life topics that appear in the “responsible” situation are based on the factual life topics that “yes” are used as the emotion. However, the master understood that in his Humane Discussion, there is a grand, but neglected duck between “yes” and “responsible”: “In every moral system I encountered, I noticed that the author had just done it according to ordinary reasoning methods, to determine the existence of God, or to make a discussion on human affairs; but suddenly, I was surprised to find that what I encountered was no longer the “yes” and “in the fate of the subject. It is not a link such as ‘, but there is no question that is not connected by ‘should’ or ‘not should’. This change is, although ignorant, has an extremely serious relationship. Since this should or should not be expressed or determined, it must be discussed and explained; at the same time, the work that seems to be complete and unthinkable, is that how this new relationship can be published by some completely different relationships should be explained. However, since the authors are not so cautious in doing things, I would like to advise readers to be careful and guard against them; and I trust that such a little attention will overturn all the pure moral system and let us see that the difference between virtue and virtue is not a single tree standing on the relationship between objects, nor is it caused by emotion. Noticed.”[2] Let us say something similar: we just made a descriptive issue, “A beats B”, and naturally made a standard life issue, “A should not beat B” or “A should not beat B”. It seems that we can issue “A should not beat B” from the actual issue of “A should not beat B” This is a standard issue. Similarly, we just made a descriptive proposition, “Zhang San helped Li Si up who fell down”, and naturally made a standard issue, “Zhang San should help Li Si” or “Zhang San helps Li Si is right”, as if the latter could be promoted from the former. And in the following paragraph, we want to ask our theory that
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